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COOPER V. AARON: THE FIRST IN THE TRIFECTA OF MODERN 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM CASES 
Ronald L. Nelson

 
Cooper v. Aaron is, indeed, still timely after sixty years. Not only has 
this 1958 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States had a 
continuing legacy in the development of civil rights in America, it has also 
played a significant role in the development of the modern relationship 
between the American federal government and the American states. The 
federal-state relationship, a product of this country’s unique brand of 
federalism, has been in flux since the days before the adoption of the 
Constitution and the 10th Amendment. Cooper v. Aaron, along with the 
subsequent decisions in New York v. United States (1992) and Printz v. 
United States (1996), have established boundaries between federal 
supremacy and state sovereignty that have had significant relevance in 21st 
century America. While Cooper declared supremacy for federal judicial 
interpretations, New York and Printz placed limits on federal legislative 
supremacy. The framework, produced by this trifecta of decisions, is the 
basis of the contemporary view of American federalism. This federalism is 
evident in the politically charged decision in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (2012) as well as the recently decided 
case of Murphy v. NCAA (2018). Both Sebelius and Murphy are examples of 
the trifecta’s federalism, a federalism that exhibits the judicial supremacy of 
Cooper as well as the commandeering limits of New York and Printz. While 
sixty years may seem to be a long time in the federalism years, Cooper is, 
indeed, still with us. 
 
 
Ronald L. Nelson, Associate Professor of Political Science and Criminal Justice, University 
of South Alabama. J.D. University of Miami School of Law; Ph.D. University of Texas at 
Austin. I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to participate in the 2018 Ben J. Altheimer 
Symposium “Cooper v Aaron: Still Timely at Sixty Years” held at the University of Arkansas 
at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. In particular, I would like to express my 
gratitude to the Law Review, Dean Theresa Beiner, and Ms. Shelby Howlett, the Symposium 
Editor, for organizing this superb Symposium. The Symposium proved to be a wonderful 
opportunity to gain understanding and share ideas. I would also like to thank my fellow 
participants for their presentations: Keynote Speaker Dr. John Kirk; and panelists Professors 
Rebecca Zietlow, Joel Goldstein, Enrique Guerra-Pujol, Christopher Schmidt, Grant 
Christensen, Mr. John Walker, Esq., Dr. LaVerne Bell-Tolliver and Dr. Sybil Hampton. In 
particular, I value the “we were there” insight presented by Mr. Walker and Drs. Bell-
Tolliver and Hampton. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1958 Cooper v. Aaron1 decision has taken its place in a long line 
of court cases decided over the years that have attempted to address racial 
discrimination in this country. While not all of the civil rights cases involved 
segregated schools, many of the earlier landmark cases were in the area of 
education e.g., Gaines v. Canada2 invalidating Missouri’s refusal to allow 
African Americans to attend the University of Missouri School of Law, 
Sweatt v. Painter3 invalidating a Texas plan to force African American 
students to attend an inferior law school, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents4 invalidating segregated classrooms in graduate classes at the 
University of Oklahoma. Following the 1954 and 1955 Brown I5 and Brown 
II6 decisions, the Civil Rights struggle of African Americans largely took 
place in the K-12 school houses of the country.7 
The basic facts of Cooper illustrate the strife of that period of our 
history. In the fall of 1957, certain state officials in Arkansas took actions to 
forcibly prohibit African American children from entering and 
desegregating Central High School in the city of Little Rock.8 This action 
was taken in direct contravention of a federal district court order and a local 
desegregation plan.9 The beginning of the 1957 school year saw Arkansas 
National Guard troops deployed to prevent African American students from 
entering Central High School as well as the subsequent deployment of 
federal troops and federalized state troops to allow students, who have come 
to be known as the Little Rock Nine,10 to attend the school. Eventually, 
Arkansas officials closed the high school as a means to foreclose integration 
in 1958.11 This action was challenged in federal court.12 The eventual result 
 
 1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 2. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
 3. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 4. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
 5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 7. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979). 
 8. Desegregation of Central High School, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE, 
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=718 (last 
updated Nov. 13, 2018). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Little Rock Nine, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE, http://www.encyclopediaof 
arkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=723 (last updated Sept. 9, 2010) 
[hereinafter Little Rock Nine]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Aaron v. Cooper, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE, http://www.encyclopedia 
ofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?search=1&entryID=741 (last updated Nov. 13, 
2018) [hereinafter Aaron v. Cooper]. 
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was the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Cooper v. Aaron and the 
re-opening of the Little Rock school.13 This was an important step along the 
long path toward desegregation in the United States and the overall 
application of the Brown decisions. 
Not surprisingly, the Cooper decision was controversial. The obvious 
direct area of contention involved battles between integration and 
segregation proponents. The desegregation of American public schools went 
through a number of phases involving political resistance and such issues as 
busing and privatization.14 An additional area of controversy involved 
questions concerning the role of the courts in addressing federal and state 
governmental relationships. Even after sixty years, the Cooper decision 
addresses serious questions regarding the very structure of the American 
system of government. 
The unique American system of constitutional government is based on 
a structure established by the attendees of the constitutional convention held 
in the summer months of 1787. While not explicitly stated in the document, 
this system has three significant underlying and, in many ways, intertwined 
principles: 
1. the separation of powers/checks and balances doctrine—which 
governs relations among the branches of the federal government, 
2. federalism—which governs relations between the states and the 
federal government, and 
3. individual rights and liberties—which governs relations between the 
government and the people.
15
 
These principles are interrelated and have been defined and refined by 
amendments, war, and decisions of the courts—particularly the Supreme 
Court.16 The federalism principle, in particular, has been shaped by the 
Supreme Court’s Cooper decision. 
 
 13. See id.; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 14. See WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 78–127. 
 15. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING 
AMERICA: A SHORT COURSE 7–10 (7th ed. 2018). 
 16. The development of modern American federalism has been greatly affected by such 
factors as the 14th Amendment and the Civil War as well as the decisions of the Supreme 
Courts. See e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that 
Maryland could not tax the Federal Government); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) 
(holding that the Federal Government could not dictate which city Oklahoma chose for its 
capital). For a broad view of the development of American federalism see DAVID M. 
O’BRIAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY 681–688 (7th ed. 2008); Edwin S. Corwin, The 
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950); Harry N. Schreiber, Federalism and 
Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 663 (1980). 
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II. AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
A. History 
Our nation’s Constitution was crafted some 231 years ago in 
Philadelphia when fifty-five delegates from the states met to address 
deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation. What resulted was the creation 
of a new kind of federated government.17 This new form—American 
federalism—was and still is a multifaceted political power relationship 
between governments and governmental units. Given the already existing 
states and the need to create an overarching central government, this 
federalism was the result of a complex18 set of compromises.19 These 
compromises produced a document that is only the basic outline of a two-
government system.20 One effect of this duality is that the American system 
consists of multiple layers of governments. Much of this American system 
was in a “to be determined” mode.21 In this form of federalism, there are 
both state and federal laws as well as a dual court system state and federal.22 
This federal form of government coupled with the three-branch principle 
created what Madison’s Federalist No. 51 characterized as a “double 
security” for the rights of the people.23 
B. Different Federalisms and Different Eras 
The development of American federalism has been an ongoing process 
characterized by swings between two basic views of the power relationship 
between the federal government and the state governments. One view holds 
that the federal government and the states are basically equal sovereigns 
each with their own separate powers.24 This view has been called Dual 
 
 17. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 276 (1985). 
 18. John Quincy Adams described the American system with its separate federal 
branches and its sovereignty shared by federal and state governments as “the most 
complicated government on the face of the globe.” See John Quincy Adams, 6th President of 
the United States, Requested Address at the New York Historical Society: The Jubilee of the 
Constitution - A Discourse (Apr. 30, 1939), available at https://lonang.com/library/reference/ 
jqadams-jubilee-constitution-1839/. 
 19. JOHN C. LIVINGSTON & ROBERT G. THOMPSON, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED 
151–53 (2d ed. 1963). 
 20. Id. at 150. 
 21. See generally KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 71 
(1st ed. 1989). 
 22. See O’BRIAN, supra note 16, at 796–98. 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 24. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 192, 193 tbl.6-1. 
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Federalism25 or Dual Sovereignty.26 Dual Federalism relies on a strict view 
of the 10th Amendment’s reserve powers provisions.27 Under this view, 
Dual Federalism is characterized by such principles as: 
 state and federal governments are coequal sovereigns each supreme 
in their own sphere; 
 the Constitution is a compact between the states and the federal 
government; 
 the 10th Amendment defines the state-federal relationship; and 
 the necessary and proper clause is to be read narrowly.28 
The other view of the federal-state power relationship, known as 
Cooperative Federalism29 or Cooperative Sovereignty,30 sees the federal 
government as generally controlling or supreme.31 This view is largely based 
on the supremacy clause of Article VI of the Constitution.32 Cooperative 
federalism is characterized by the view that: 
 the federal government is supreme in all areas under its jurisdiction 
even if the state sphere is affected; 
 the Constitution is a product of the people’s consent and not the 
states; 
 the 10th Amendment is not a source of power for the states; and 
 
 25. Id.; See also Troy E. Smith, Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM IN AMERICA: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php/Dual_Federalism (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Dual Federalism]. 
 26. The term “dual sovereignty” has in some cases been used to describe the dual 
federalism concept. See e.g., infra note 98 and accompanying text (Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
use of the term to describe the American constitutional system in Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 918 (1997)). 
 27. See Dual Federalism, supra note 25; EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 192, 193 
tbl.6-1. 
 28. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 192, 193 tbl.6-1. 
 29. Id. at 192; see also Mary Hallock Morris, Cooperative Federalism, in FEDERALISM 
IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php/Cooperative 
_Federalism (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Cooperative Federalism]. 
 30. The term “cooperative sovereignty” has in some cases been used to describe the 
cooperative federalism concept. See, e.g., SHAILER MATHEWS, THE VALIDITY OF AMERICAN 
IDEAS 150–63 (1922). 
 31. See Cooperative Federalism, supra note 29; EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 
192, 193 tbl.6-1. 
 32. See Cooperative Federalism, supra note 29; EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 
192, 193 tbl.6-1. 
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 the necessary and proper clause is to be read broadly.33 
These two alternate views of American federalism frequently collide 
when state and federal boundary questions arise. These questions first ask 
who has the authority to decide, and then ask where exactly the boundary 
between federal and state sovereigns is. Such issues have found their way to 
the Supreme Court on a regular and continuing basis, and the Court has 
struggled with them. In fact, some scholars who have tracked the Court’s 
view over the years suggest that there has been a pendulum swing between 
the two. For example, political scientists Lee Epstein of Washington 
University and Thomas Walker of Emory University observed the following 
eras or doctrinal cycles: 
Marshall Court (1801–1835)    Cooperative Federalism 
Taney Court (1835–1864)    Dual Federalism 
Civil War/Reconstruction Court (1865–1895) Cooperative Federalism 
Laissez-Faire Court (1896–1936)  Dual Federalism 
Post-New Deal Court (1937–1975)  Cooperative Federalism 
Burger Court (1976–1985)  Dual to Cooperative 
Federalism 
Rehnquist Court (1986–2005)   Mild Dual Federalism 
Roberts Court (2005–present)   Mild Dual Federalism34 
C. Modern Federalism 
 As demonstrated by the swings from Dual to Cooperative 
Federalism and back, the question of where the boundary is between the 
federal government and the states is complicated. The answer to the 
question is, in some respects, tied to another aspect of the American system. 
The principle of separation of powers plays a role here. For where the 
 
 33. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 15, at 193 tbl.6-1. 
 34. Id. at 193 tbl.6-2. For a background discussion of American federalism, see 
RICHARD H. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1–24 (1st ed. 1970). For opposing views of the 
general development of modern American federalism, see John Kinkaid, The Eclipse of Dual 
Federalism by One-Way Cooperative Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1061 (2017), 
http://arizonastatelawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Kincaid_Pub.pdf (discussing 
limits of states in federal-state relations); John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining 
Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27 (1998), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu 
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1777&context
=facpubs (discussing a rise in modern dual federalism). 
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boundary lies often depends on which branch or branches of the federal 
government are involved with what aspect of the states. For example, in 
Cooper, the primary players were the federal courts and the state of 
Arkansas.35 In the 1992 New York v. United States36 case, the primary 
players were Congress and the state of New York. 
Moreover, in the 1997 Printz v. United States37 case, the primary 
players were Congress and the two county sheriffs. Cooper, New York, and 
Printz form a trifecta of cases that highlight and inform the ongoing debates 
that surround modern American federalism.38 American federalism is a 
complex institution. In particular, this quality is apparent in the federal-state 
relationships concerning the issues of supremacy and commandeering. 
Some might ask why use the term “trifecta” when discussing Supreme 
Court cases and federalism. What is a “trifecta?” For some in Little Rock, 
the term is quite familiar. Quite familiar since the Oaklawn Park Racetrack 
is just some fifty miles or so down the road from the University of Arkansas 
at Little Rock’s William H. Bowen School of Law campus. And, while the 
horse racing season is over for Oaklawn Park this year, some are looking 
forward to the next season and the opportunity to speculate on the first, 
second, and third place finishers of the race with a trifecta wager. Aside 
from the horse racing betting, the term trifecta has, according to the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, come to mean a grouping of three things.39 
Cooper, New York, and Printz are three Supreme Court cases that have 
played a significant first, second, and third place role in shaping the 
interplay of constitutional principles in modern American society—
particularly in the development of the contemporary application of 
American federalism.40 
1. Cooper v Aaron: States, the Court and Supremacy 
Cooper v. Aaron, first in the trifecta of modern federalism cases, dealt 
with a state’s defiance of a federal court order to desegregate a public school 
in accordance with the Brown decision.41 The Cooper decision, a unanimous 
per curium opinion signed by the nine justices, addressed the question of the 
location of the boundary between a state and the federal judicial branch as 
 
 35. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 36. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 37. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 38. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 1; New York, 505 U.S. at 144; Printz, 521 U.S. at 898. 
 39. Trifecta, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/trifecta (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 40. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 1; New York, 505 U.S. at 144; Printz, 521 U.S. at 898. 
 41. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4; see also Little Rock Nine, supra note 10. 
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well as the question of who is to decide federalism issues.42 As stated in the 
opinion, the Cooper case involved “actions by the Governor and Legislature 
of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in 
Brown v. Board of Education.”43 While the School Board of Little Rock 
formulated a desegregation plan for Central High School for the 1957 school 
year, the plan was thwarted by state legislation and Arkansas’s Governor 
who ordered the intervention by state National Guard troops.44 Eventually, 
federal and federalized troops were employed to restore order to Little Rock 
and to allow African American students to attend school.45 
In defiance of Brown and desegregation, Governor Orval Faubus 
declared that “the Supreme Court decision is not the law of the land.”46 The 
Cooper case was filed in response to the local School Board’s subsequent 
request for a two-and-a-half year delay in implementing segregation in Little 
Rock.47 In offering a specific response to Governor Faubus’s argument that 
the Brown decision was not the law of the land, the Supreme Court declared 
that “we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor and 
Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case.”48 The 
Court’s rejection of the Faubus position was based on three sources: 
(1) Article VI Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution that declares that the 
Constitution is the “supreme Law of the Land;”49 
(2) Article VI Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution that requires every state 
legislator, executive, and judicial officer to take an oath to support the 
Constitution; and
50
 
(3) the Marbury v Madison
51
 decision that identifies the Constitution as 
“the fundamental and paramount law of the nation;”52 and affirms that “it 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”53 The Cooper decision declares that: 
 
 42. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19. 
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. Little Rock Nine, supra note 10. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron 
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 397 (1982) https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs 
/328/ (citing NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN 
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S, 273 (1st ed. 1969)). 
 47. Aaron v. Cooper, supra note 12. 
 48. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17. 
 49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 52. Id. at 177. 
 53. Id. 
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the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been 
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows 
that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme 
law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of 
binding effect on the States.
54
 
In essence, the Court ruled that it was the decider of the boundary 
question and that the boundary in the case of desegregation was on the side 
of the federal government and the Brown decisions.55 As a result of this 
reasoning, the Court ruled that desegregation in Little Rock should move 
forward, that the state should desist from further efforts to thwart the 
desegregation plan, and that the state was bound to action by federalism and 
the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court in Brown.56 
a. Judicial Supremacy and its critics 
While many recognize that the situation in Little Rock required firm 
action in the face of the action of the Arkansas officials, the Cooper decision 
and its claim of what has been called the concept of “judicial supremacy” 
has had its critics. Perhaps most notably, a number of Presidents, e.g., 
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt
 
have indicated opposition to the 
concept of judicial supremacy.57 Academic commentators such as Professors 
Alexander Bickel and Phillip Kurland have written extensively criticizing 
the Court’s Cooper decision.58 Others have argued that, rather than supreme, 
the Court’s pronouncements should be viewed as part of a dialogue with the 
other branches.59 Former Attorney General Edwin Meese has expressed the 
view that constitutional interpretation is independent for each branch.60 
 
 54. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
 55. Id.; see also Aaron v. Cooper, supra note 12. 
 56. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18; see also Aaron v. Cooper, supra note 12. 
 57. See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6 (2001); Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its 
Discontents, 20 CONST. COMMENT 405 (2003), http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_ 
articles/144; Paul Moreno, The Myth of Judicial Supremacy, NAT’L REV. (June 26, 2015, 6:20 
PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/06/not-law-land/. 
 58. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 263–65 (2d ed. 1962); PHILIP KURLAND, POLITICS, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 116, 185 (1970). 
 59. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 
(1993). 
 60. Edwin Meese III, Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1987). 
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Additionally, Mr. Meese has asserted that there is a distinction between 
the Constitution and constitutional law. And, more particularly, he has 
claimed that the Constitution “is a document of our most fundamental law” 
while constitutional law is what the Supreme Court, “in its limited role of 
offering judgment” says about the Constitution.61 Given this distinction, Mr. 
Meese views Supreme Court decisions as only binding on “the parties in a 
case and also the executive branch for whatever enforcement is necessary. 
However, such a decision does not establish a supreme law of the land that 
is binding on all persons and parts of the government henceforth and 
forevermore.”62 With respect to Cooper, Mr. Meese argues that the Court’s 
assumption of supremacy was based on a “flawed reading” of Marbury and 
that the equating of the Court’s decisions with the Constitution itself was 
based on a faulty syllogism of legal reasoning.63 
Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat of Hastings College of Law has argued 
that the view that state officials are obliged to support and cooperate with 
federal laws is “inconsistent with the constitutional vision of the Framers” 
and that the actions of Arkansas’s governor and legislature were moral and 
not constitutional errors.64 Citing Madison’s double security in Federalist 
51,65 Professor Bhagwat argues that the judicial supremacy of the Cooper 
decision contradicts the role of federalism in the Framer’s design.66 In his 
view “federalism is as important a part of our system of limited and 
balanced powers as is the separation of powers at the national level.”67 And, 
in order for the design to work “state governments, no less than the branches 
of the national government, must have the ability to resist (to their minds) 
improper assertions of power from the center.”68 Professor Bhagwat goes so 
far as to conclude that “sometimes the role of state officials includes 
disagreement with, and even defiance of, the policies and meanings 
championed by federal officials, including the federal judiciary.”69 With 
respect to the judiciary, the Professor does note that such resistance is not 
applicable to the state courts in that the state judges are bound to treat 
 
 61. Id. at 981–82. 
 62. Id. at 983. 
 63. Id. at 986; but see Allan Ides, Judicial Supremacy and the Law of the Constitution, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 491, 519 (1999) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court declares what the law of the 
Constitution is, the Constitution and the Court’s interpretation of it become one, and the 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is, therefore one with the supreme law of the 
land.”). 
 64. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Cooper v. Aaron and the Faces of Federalism, 52 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1087, 1087–88 (2008).   
 65. Id. at 1097. 
 66. Id. at 1087. 
 67. Id. at 1097. 
 68. Id. at 1097–98. 
 69. Id. at 1113. 
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federal law as supreme over state law.70 On the other hand, as seen by the 
cases of Chief Judge Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court involving 
the application of Supreme Court decisions on Ten Commandment displays 
and same-sex marriage, some argue that federal court decisions do not bind 
state courts.71 
Professor Larry Kramer, Professor of Law at New York University, in 
discussing his view of “the idea of judicial supremacy,”72 notes that “The 
Supreme Court has made its grab for power. The question is will we let 
them get away with it?”73 In subsequent work, Professor Kramer writes that 
the public should be the ultimate supreme decider of the judicial decisions.74 
His view of the proper balance in our system is that “the authority of judicial 
decisions formally and explicitly depends on reactions from the other 
branches and, through them, from the public.”75 He answers his earlier 
question by declaring that “[t]he Supreme Court is not the highest authority 
in the land on constitutional law. We are.”76 
b. Cooper and general acceptance 
On the other hand, while Professor Kramer calls the Cooper claim of 
judicial supremacy “bluster and puff,” he acknowledges that the concept has 
found “wide public acceptance.”77 Others have also noted Cooper’s 
acceptance. For example, David Strauss of the University of Chicago argues 
that the “moral capital” accumulated from cases like Cooper have elevated 
the judicial supremacy concept to a high water mark.78 Professors Larry 
Alexander and Fred Schauer argue that Cooper’s judicial supremacy offers a 
crucial component of the American system—settlement of contested 
issues.79 In effect, Alexander and Schauer suggest that someone has to be the 
 
 70. Bhagwat, supra note 64, at 1099. 
 71. Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama, Chief Justice, Suspended over Gay 
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decider regarding how the Constitution is to be applied in any particular 
situation and that someone is the judiciary.80 Constitutional interpretations 
are continuously made by any number of decision makers, e.g., members of 
Congress, the President, the cop on the beat, and the courts at various 
levels.81 In the end, however, the buck stops with the Court.82 
Professor Josh Blackman has written an innovative article regarding 
the development of Cooper that is pending publication in the Georgetown 
Law Journal.83 Entitled: The Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v. Aaron, this 
work explores the Cooper case with a creative research methodology—a 
close study of the written papers of eight of the nine justices who decided 
Cooper: Justices Black, Brennan, Burton, Clark, Douglas, Frankfurter, 
Harlan, and Chief Justice Warren.84 In particular, the work explores the 
concepts of judicial supremacy and universality. Professor Blackman 
describes the judicial supremacy concept as the view that whatever the 
Supreme Court holds is the supreme law of the land and the universality 
concept as the belief that the decisions of the Supreme Court apply broadly, 
i.e., to those not parties to the underlying lawsuit.85 Professor Blackman 
concludes that judicial supremacy of Supreme Court rulings and their 
universal application are, in fact, myths—myths that are not supported by 
the Constitution but rather by social norms.86 In the end, however, Professor 
Blackman recognizes that not following Supreme Court decisions like 
Brown would be irresponsible and that such obedience is “justified by 
prudence, the need for stability, and respect for the judiciary.”87 
2. Boundaries: Congress, the Court and “Commandeering” 
While the Cooper decision dealt with the boundaries between the Court 
and state officials, another aspect of modern American federalism involves 
the boundary between actions of the federal government and the states. As 
history notes, this boundary has been the subject of debate since the 
inception of the Constitution.88 A recent aspect of this debate has been the 
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question of federal requisitioning of state policies and personnel. A 
significant development in this area has been the involvement of the 
Supreme Court in setting boundaries between legitimate cooperation 
between federal and state actors and the forced cooperation that has become 
known as federal commandeering. 
What is this thing called “commandeering?” Where did it come from 
and what does it have to do with modern American federalism? According 
to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, to commandeer means to “take 
arbitrary or forcible possession of.”89 The term has as its history the 
military taking control of civilian resources.90 With respect to federalism, 
commandeering means the requiring by the federal government—
particularly by Congress—of states or state officials to adopt or enforce 
federal law or policy.91 More specifically, the term has come to mean 
imposing targeted, affirmative, coercive duties on state legislators or 
executive officials.92 In response to such action, an anti-commandeering 
doctrine has developed.93 This doctrine is largely based on the 10th 
Amendment and its reservation of unenumerated powers to the states or the 
people.94 The constitutional limit on commandeering was established by the 
two remaining Supreme Court cases of our trifecta. These two cases have set 
in place a marker for the boundary between federal and states actions. This 
anti-commandeering marker prohibits the federal government from forcing 
states to do its bidding and has been called a “judicially-created federalism 
protection.”95 
a. New York v. United States 
Second in the trifecta of modern federalism cases is the 1992 case of 
New York v. United States. This case involved the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.96 This Act was designed to address 
the difficult issue of the disposal of radioactive material generated by a 
number of sources, e.g., the government, hospitals, research institutions, and 
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various industries.97 Provisions of the Act offered a variety of incentives to 
the states, including financial incentives, for appropriate disposal of the 
wastes.98 The Act also provided that, should a state not provide for the 
disposal of the wastes, the state would “take-title to” and possession of the 
wastes.99 And, as a result, these states would be liable for any subsequent 
resultant damages from the wastes.100 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the six-justice majority opinion in 
New York that struck down the “take-title” section of the Act.101 While 
addressing the modern problem of radioactive wastes, Justice O’Connor 
noted that federalism is an old question: “The constitutional question is as 
old as the Constitution: It consists of discerning the proper division of 
authority between the Federal Government and the States.”102 Continuing 
with a quote from Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Association, Inc.,103 Justice O’Connor recognized that in some cases 
federalism imposes limits, not on the states, but the federal government: “As 
an initial matter, Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.’“104 And declaring that “[s]tates are not mere 
political subdivisions of the United States,”105 she found that “whatever the 
outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.”106 
Justice O’Connor discussed Cooper v. Aaron in her consideration of 
commandeering and federalism.107 She specifically addressed the role of the 
Court in deciding issues regarding federal power raised by the United 
States108 in response to the federal government’s claim based on a number of 
cases, including Cooper, that “the Constitution does, in some circumstances, 
permit federal directives to state governments.”109 Justice O’Connor 
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explained that the federal courts’ power to command state officials to 
comply with federal law are not powers shared with Congress.110 Justice 
O’Connor concluded: 
In sum, the cases relied upon by the United States hold only that 
federal law is enforceable in state courts and that federal courts may in 
proper circumstances order state officials to comply with federal law, 
propositions that by no means imply any authority on the part of Congress to 
mandate state regulation.111 
b. Printz v. United States 
Third, in the trifecta of modern federalism cases, is the 1997 case of 
Printz v. United States. Printz is a case involving the Gun Control Act of 
1968.112 The Act prohibits firearms dealers from transferring firearms to a 
variety of individuals including convicted felons, unlawful users of 
controlled substances, fugitives, individuals judged to be mentally defective 
and persons dishonorably discharged from the military.113 A 1993 
amendment to the Act, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady 
Act),114 included a provision to establish a national database for instant 
background checks regarding firearms sales. An additional provision 
required local state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks 
until the national database became operational.115 Certain county sheriffs 
challenged the constitutionality of the Brady Act’s interim local check 
provisions as improper commandeering.116 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Printz, which 
affirmed the New York v. United States prohibition on congressional 
attempts to compel state actions and extended that prohibition to 
congressional efforts to compel actions of individual state officials.117 In 
particular, Justice Scalia emphasized a constitutional commitment to a “dual 
sovereignty” view of modern American federalism based on the 10th 
Amendment.118 Justice Scalia’s view of federalism envisioned two separate 
spheres of authority as essential to the overall constitutional design: 
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This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s 
structural protections of liberty. “Just as the separation and independence of 
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of 
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk 
of tyranny and abuse from either front.”119 
With respect to the judiciary, Justice Scalia drew a distinction between 
federal statutes imposing obligations on state courts and those directed to 
state executive officials. While the courts, as part of the federal legal system, 
can be compelled, Justice Scalia held that state officials are different and 
cannot be pressed into federal service.120 
c. Development of anti-commandeering doctrine  
Recent cases have continued the New York and Printz view of modern 
American federalism. In the 2012 case of National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,121 the various provisions of the 2010 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act122 were challenged under a 
number of grounds. Ultimately, the basic Act was upheld as valid under 
Article II Section 8—the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution.123 
However, one challenged provision of the Act was declared an 
unconstitutional intrusion into state sovereignty and violative of the 
principles of federalism.124 This provision stripped all federal Medicaid 
funding from states not participating in the Medicaid Expansion aspect of 
the Act.
 125 The majority opinion of Chief Justice John Roberts regarding the 
rejection of the loss of funding provision rested largely on the New York-
Printz view of federalism. Chief Justice Roberts summarized the limits on 
the federal government role in modern American federalism: “the 
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability 
to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”126 And, 
while he recognized that “Congress may use its spending power to create 
incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies,”127 Chief 
Justice Roberts cautioned: “when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the 
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legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.”128 Citing New York, 
he reaffirmed that “the Constitution simply does not give Congress the 
authority to require the States to regulate.”129 
Not surprisingly, this anti-commandeering doctrine has been 
questioned. For example, Professor Steven Schwinn argues that this 
“doctrine has no basis in the text and structure of the Constitution” and 
instead the Supremacy Clause and Oath Clause (Article VI Clause 4) bind 
state laws and officials to federal law.130 Additionally, Professor Schwinn 
points out that the Constitution itself commandeers the states in various 
ways e.g., requiring state legislatures to provide for the election of federal 
representatives in Congress (Article I Sections 3 and 4), requiring state 
officials to deliver fugitives from justice (Article IV), setting militia 
appointment and training to federal standards (Article I Section 8) and 
requiring the granting of full faith and credit to the laws of other states 
(Article IV).131 Professor Schwinn concludes that history does not support 
the anti-commandeering doctrine. More specifically, he cites Hamilton in 
Federalist No. 27 and Madison in Federalist No. 44, as evidence of the 
framer’s expectancy that state officials would carry out federal laws.132 
Similarly, Professor Evan Caminker also claims that the anti-
commandeering view of proper federal actions is a faulty view of dual 
sovereignty because “it relies on an unpersuasive originalist argument 
concerning the Framers’ constitutional design.”133 Other scholars view the 
anti-commandeering doctrine as without real precedent.134 
Despite these objections, the anti-commandeering doctrine is alive and 
well. Just this year, the Supreme Court decided another modern federalism 
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case involving sports gambling in the states. In the case of Murphy v. 
NCAA,135 decided May 14, 2018, the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act,136 which limited state and local sports gambling, was 
challenged as violative of the “anti-commandeering” principles of the 
Constitution. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the majority opinion that relied on 
a dual sovereignty view of federalism under the New York-Printz 
rationale:137 
The legislative powers granted to Congress are sizable, but they are not 
unlimited. The Constitution confers on Congress not plenary legislative 
power but only certain enumerated powers. Therefore, all other legislative 
power is reserved for the States, as the Tenth Amendment confirms. And 
conspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power 
to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The 
anticommandeering doctrine simply represents the recognition of this limit 
on congressional authority.138 
Given these recent examples of the continued application of the “anti-
commandeering” doctrine developed in the second and third trifecta cases, 
New York and Printz, the concept seems to have established itself as an 
important factor in the boundary determinations between Congress and the 
states that is enforced by the courts. 
d. Recent modern federalism applications 
The Murphy decision illustrates that debates regarding modern 
American federalism are ongoing. Another example of current debates 
concerning the continuing federal-state boundary line issue is seen in the 
context of federal immigration efforts that are countered by actions of 
certain states. Here we see the trifecta at play. In some cases, a state will 
want to go beyond federal immigration requirements and take action on its 
own. This situation was addressed in Arizona v. United States,139 a Supreme 
Court case involving an Arizona state law that purported to give 
immigration law enforcement powers to local law enforcement. The case 
raised the question of the boundary between the federal and state 
governments and who decides.140 The Supreme Court ruled several sections 
of the state law involved federal matters and were therefore preempted from 
Arizona’s authority.141 As a result, the Supreme Court limited Arizona from 
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taking certain actions in the immigration field.142 This illustrates a flipped 
version of Cooper, which demanded the taking of actions by Arkansas 
officials regarding desegregation. 
On the other hand, a commandeering situation has arisen when states 
do not want to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. 
Several state and local governments have declared themselves as 
“sanctuaries” from the federal government’s immigration law enforcement 
activities.143 This sanctuary status can take a variety of forms. Generally, the 
sanctuary means that the local governments will not cooperate or assist with 
federal actions—especially immigration enforcement.144 The movement 
stems from the 1980s when a number of groups, religious groups in 
particular, opposed federal asylum policy regarding Central American 
refugees.145 Recently, President Trump issued an Executive Order that 
purported to withhold federal funds from localities that refused to support 
the Administration’s immigration enforcement actions.146 Not unexpectedly, 
this federalism issue has been taken to the courts. For example, in the case 
of City of Chicago v. Sessions, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit ruled that the Administration’s effort to force assistance 
through the funding process goes beyond what the applicable statutes allow: 
“The Attorney General, in this case, used the sword of federal funding to 
conscript state and local authorities to aid in federal civil immigration 
enforcement” and characterized the approach as a “usurpation of 
power.”147After a number of federal courts issued injunctions blocking the 
withholding of funds and the upholding of the injunctions at the federal 
appellate level, the Trump Administration has asked the Supreme Court to 
rule on the injunctions.148 The situation pends. 
 
 142. Id. at 416. 
 143. See generally Tal Kopan, What are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They be Defunded?, 
CNN (Mar. 26, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-
explained/index.html. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). For a discussion of this 
action by the President and its relation to the commandeering question, see Ilya Somin, Why 
Trump’s Executive Order on Sanctuary Cities is Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/constit-
utional-problems-with-trumps-executive-order-on-sanctuary-
cities/?utm_term=.6a1f6980b718. 
 147. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d. 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 148. Ariane de Vogue, Trump Admin Asks Supreme Court to Lift Ban on Sanctuary City 
Policy, CNN (June 18, 2018 10:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/sanctuary-
cities-supreme-court/index.html. 
252 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
III. CONCLUSION 
This discussion of the trifecta of modern American federalism cases 
has involved two important principles of the American system of 
government—separation of powers and federalism.149 Cooper’s 
pronouncements regarding judicial supremacy, in particular, have had a 
direct impact on these concepts. As noted previously,150 the claim that the 
Court’s interpretations of the Constitution are merely interpretations of 
constitutional law and not the Constitution has been debated. The reality is 
that the Court’s interpretations bring about a settlement of the constitutional 
questions that come before it. The Court’s interpretations may be 
challenged, but they are usually followed. In that respect, Supreme Court 
decisions are enforced through general acceptance. It is true that, over time, 
the Court’s decisions may be modified or overturned or even subject to 
Article V amendment. As a result, the law is dynamic. This dynamism is 
part of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. There have always been 
changes in the boundaries between the states and the federal governments. 
We see this in the different eras of dual and cooperative federalism.151 
Nonetheless, the Court’s interpretations are followed by the states—
perhaps grudgingly as seen in Cooper. And, as set out in New York and 
Printz, this also applies to the other branches of the federal government—
perhaps grudgingly as well. Cooper’s principles regarding judicial 
supremacy apply to both the federal and the state governments in cases 
involving the boundaries between the two. 
The debate over modern American federalism, while in some ways a 
moving target, is bounded by our trifecta of modern American federalism 
cases: Cooper, New York, and Printz. As the first-place finisher in the 
trifecta, Cooper stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court is the 
“decider” in cases involving the principles of federal-state boundaries. In 
particular, Cooper deals with state actions in modern American federalism. 
And, with respect to federal actions regarding states in modern American 
federalism, the second and third place finishers of the trifecta, New York and 
Printz—address limits as well—applicable to actions of the federal 
government. Who decides is the key question in the debates over modern 
American federalism. The answer is found in a trifecta of cases, which 
begins with Cooper v. Aaron. 
Recently, the University of South Alabama hosted Professor Michael 
Gerhardt of the University of North Carolina School of Law as part of the 
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2018 Constitution Day program. After discussing several of the docketed 
cases for the Supreme Court’s upcoming 2018-2019 term, Professor 
Gerhardt, who has served as Special Counsel to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee regarding several Supreme Courts Justice nominations, offered 
commentary on the Supreme Court and the direction of the law. In his 
remarks, he emphasized that, in his view, the Court’s future work would 
largely be in the areas of statutory interpretation and questions of 
federalism.152 Professor Gerhardt is likely to be right and, as a result, Cooper 
is especially timely, even after sixty years. 
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